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''There Must Be No 
Holes in Our Sweeping'': 
The 31st Canadian Minesweeping 
Flotilla on D-Day 
Michael Whitby 
Of the weapons the German navy could use against the invasion, Allied naval 
planners feared mines the most. In March 
1944, for instance, Admiral Sir Bertram 
Ramsay, the naval commander for Operation 
Neptune, confided to his diary "There is no 
doubt that the mine is the greatest obstacle to 
success." 1 If unswept, these sinister 
underwater weapons could not only sink many 
ships and landing craft but seriously upset 
the intricate timing of the assault. In the 
largest minesweeping operation ever 
undertaken, 24 7 minesweepers were deployed 
to sweep ten approach lanes across the 
English Channel, clear the disembarkation 
and fire support sectors of the assault area 
and then sweep the final paths to the beaches. 
The British and Americans lacked the 
resources to mount this massive operation by 
themselves, and among the vessels 
contributed by other countries were sixteen 
Bangor-class minesweepers of the Royal 
Canadian Navy. 
Minesweeping had been a serious 
concern to the RCN since the First World War 
when German U -cruisers laid mines off the 
Halifax approaches. During the interwar 
years the navy routinely practised sweeping, 
and the only warships built in Canada during 
this period were four Fundy-class 
minesweepers. The role was not lost sight of 
when war came again as nearly all vessels 
ordered during the early emergency expansion 
had at least some minesweeping capability. 
Yet, apart from one brief scare in 1943, these 
vessels, including fifty-four Bangor-class 
minesweepers, were utilized as convoy escorts, 
thus their mine sweeping equipment, and their 
crews' ability to use it, grew rusty. 
Consequently, in early 1944 when the RCN 
agreed to provide sixteen Bangors to Neptune 
for minesweeping, only one of them had any 
experience at that duty. 2 
The skill that had to be mastered in 
time for the invasion was quite complex. In 
simple terms, the type of minesweeping 
practised by the RCN Bangors involved cutting 
the cables of moored mines with a long 
serrated line or "sweep" streamed over the 
stern. The equipment most often used was 
the Oropesa sweep which consisted of a blimp-
shaped "float" to mark and support its end; a 
number of "kites" and "otters" attached from 
lines along its length to keep it at the required 
depth; and "cutters" positioned near the end 
of the sweep to either explode mines or force 
them to the surface where they could be 
destroyed by gunfire. Powerful steam winches 
and davits on the minesweeper's stern helped 
deploy and recover the complex equipment, 
which, depending on conditions and the task 
being carried out, could extend up to 800 
metres astern. 3 Even in the most gentle seas, 
sweeping was a challenging operation that 
required endless drill to perfect. 
The Canadians received their training 
upon arrival in England. Although he expected 
the Canadians to require some familiarization, 
Commander F.M.S. Temple, RN, the British 
officer responsible for their instruction, was 
somewhat taken aback at the job that 
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confronted him. The Canadians, he observed, 
"were not minesweeping minded as they had 
been employed solely on escort work. Some 
were also under the impression that 
minesweeping was child's play."4 Temple's 
attitude appears to have been typical of officers 
within the minesweeping fraternity who 
thought that those outside did not give the 
specialty its due. 5 For his part, the Canadians' 
senior officer, Commander A.H.G. Storrs, 
RCNR, recalls the British "sucking their teeth 
wondering if these Canadians are really up to 
it."6 They were, but only after work-ups that 
stretched from mid-March to late May 1944. 
During this time the various components of 
sweeping were practised relentlessly, and the 
Bangors' equipment was brought up to 
scratch. The training culminated in a number 
of major exercises including the six-day 
Operation "Gantry" in which the Canadians, 
despite poor visibility and some equipment 
failures, successfully located and swept a 
large field of 150 dummy mines. 7 Temple now 
considered them "efficient, keen and 
competent. "8 
Besides the training programme, much 
of the credit for this increased state of 
efficiency must go to Commander Storrs. A 
superb leader and seaman, Storrs received 
his early naval training in the RN during the 
mid -1920s but had spent most of the interwar 
years in the merchant service where he 
eventually earned his foreign master's 
certificate. He joined the Canadian naval 
reserve early in the war, and after commanding 
a number of vessels had been appointed 
senior officer of the minesweepers when they 
headed overseas. 9 Because sweeping 
formations closely adhered to the movements 
ofthe lead ship, Storrs' ability and experience 
were to be key factors in the Canadians' 
success. 
In the midst of their preparations, the 
Canadians suffered two setbacks. They had 
looked forward to leading the soldiers of the 
3rd Canadian Division into Juno Beach, but 
in what Storrs described as a "great 
disappointment," they were assigned to the 
HMCS Caraquet 
(CFPU PMR 93-40 1) 
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American landings, perhaps because planners 
"thought that probably we'd manage better 
with the Americans than the Brits." 10 They 
had also hoped to form the sixteen ships into 
two complete RCN flotillas but, instead, were 
split up. Ten Bangors were assigned to the 
31st Canadian Mine sweeping Flotilla under 
Storrs while the remainder were dispersed 
among three British flotillas. The one thing 
that remained in common was that they were 
all attached to the Western Task Force so 
would be leading the way into the American 
beaches Utah and Omaha. 
The 31st's responsibility was to sweep 
Approach ChannelS into Omaha Beach. After 
poor weather postponed Neptune for twenty-
four hours, the flotilla weighed anchor at 
Portland in the early hours of 5 June and 
headed east up the Channel towards Z-Buoy 
- the junction area for the assault convoys 
south of Portsmouth which became famous 
as "Picadilly Circus" - the starting point of 
their 130-kilometre sweep towards the 
Normandy coast. Getting to Z-Buoy took 
most of the day, and it was not until evening 
that the flotilla and its attendant vessels 
formed up to clear and mark their path to the 
beaches. 11 
The sweepers advanced in a formation -
specifically, "G port"- that was not unlike 
that used by snowplows clearing an airport 
runway. Two Fairmile "B" motor launches led 
sweeping ahead of the leading Bangor, 
Commander Storrs' HMCS Caraquet. Astern 
came the Bangors Fort William, Wasaga and 
Cowie han in echelon to port with their sweeps 
overlapping, then Minas, Malapeque, 
Blairmore, and Milltown ready to replace any 
ships that fell out due to breakdowns or 
enemy action. In the midst of this formation, 
HMCS Bayfield and another vessel laid dimly-
lit dan buoys to mark the swept channel. The 
ships advanced at 7.5 knots and cleared a 
lane just over a thousand metres wide. 
Because it was critical that the formation 
remain intact so that no mines would be 
missed, vessels were under strict orders to 
hold their course even if heavily engaged and, 
for fear of alerting the enemy, mines that rose 
to the surface were not to be exploded unless 
they directly imperilled other ships. 12 
According to one officer in HMCS Georgian, 
"we were to hold our course, no matter what 
was ahead - there must be no holes in our 
sweeping as ships loaded with troops would 
be following on us, and would be depending 
on us." 13 
The operation required precise 
navigation and superb seamanship. For 
navigation, sonic buoys and QH (the naval 
version of GEE) worked to a limited degree 
but, according to Storrs, it was the new radio 
aid QM, later known as DECCA, that "enabled 
the minesweepers to establish the swept 
channels to the essential degree of accuracy. "14 
But even with this, demanding sea conditions 
created problems. Quite apart from the poor 
weather, powerful tidal currents ran across 
the heading of the formation and, to make 
matters worse, that night the tidal stream 
was much stronger than anticipated due to 
the fresh westerly breeze that had been 
blowing for two days. 15 With what one captain 
in the flotilla considered "a great deal of skill 
and knowledge of the tides," 16 Storrs 
calculated the offsets in course required to 
Commander A.H.G. Storrs. For his role in Operation Neptune, 
he was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross and the 
American Legion of Merit. (CFPU L-4932) 
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The sweep deck of a Bangor-class minesweeper. An Oropesafloat complete with marker flag is visible to the left 
with a kite behind it. A portion of the powerful steam winch can be seen at the bottom. The right-hand davit has 
just deployed the other float. (NAC PA 180532) 
counteract the current and decided the correct 
direction of the sweeps so that they lay with 
the tidal current. Complicating matters, the 
swept channel was not perfectly straight but 
followed a series of gentle doglegs, each 
requiring minor course changes. Further, 
when the tidal current reversed itself in the 
middle of the passage, the entire formation 
had to recover sweeps, reverse course, head 
up their swept channel, reverse course again, 
re-deploy their sweeps to starboard and 
resume where they had left off. Except for 
one dan-buoy being cut, this difficult, time-
consuming manoeuvring was completed 
without incident. It was a remarkable display 
of shiphandling. 
Sailors' messes in the forward part of 
the Bangors were sealed to prevent casualties 
if a mine exploded therefore off-duty personnel 
64 
spent the passage on the upper deck. 
Gathered around the funnels for warmth, 
they expected the night to erupt momentarily 
with gun flashes and tracer fire. Steaming at 
the head of the assault flotillas, the 
minesweepers were the most vulnerable 
vessels in the invasion armada, and Neptune 
planners thought they would be detected by 
the enemy, and suffer heavily for it, predicting 
thirty to fifty percent casualties among the 
lead flotillas. Yet the night remained quiet; 
no mines exploded and the only outward sign 
of enemy activity visible from on deck was the 
anti-aircraft barrage put up over Normandy 
in response to Allied bombing. Amazingly, to 
the west of the 31st, the British 14th Flotilla, 
which included the Canadian Bangors 
Guysborough, Kenora, VegreviHe and 
Georgian, swept close enough to the French 
coast to distinguish individual houses but 
were still not detected. 17 
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Twenty minutes past midnight on 6 
June, the 31st Flotilla reached the terminal 
point of the assault channel about fifteen 
kilometres off the French coast. They then 
began the tedious work of clearing the 
transport area from where soldiers would 
disembark from their assault ships and 
sweeping the channel that warships would 
follow to their bombardment positions. These 
tasks entailed steaming parallel to the 
shoreline, close under enemy guns. At one 
vulnerable moment, when making a turn 
about two kilometres offshore, the moon 
emerged from behind the clouds to expose the 
Bangors in its pale glow but after thirty 
excruciating seconds the moon retreated 
behind cover; the defences remained mute. 
That assignment finished, the Bangors 
returned towards the transport area to begin 
their final task. As they steamed slowly 
north, Lieutenant J.C. Marston, RCNR, 
captain of HMCS Blairmore recalled, 
. . . the dark of the night began to give way 
to twilight [and] one could begin to 
appreciate the immensity of the operation. 
As light increased more and more dark 
shapes began to make distinctive forms, 
and what had appeared to be just a few 
ships in close proximity now became a 
whole panorama of sea power stretching 
as far as the eye [could see] to seaward. 18 
Amid this awesome sight, the 31st formed 
into line abreast and turned south. Sweeping 
to the ten-fathom line off Omaha beach, they 
cleared the way for the assault craft about to 
head for shore. Only at this time did German 
shells begin to plunge into the sea nearby. 
While recovering her sweeps- Caraquet 
and Fort William had to release theirs when 
they became entangled in wrecks- Blairmore 
found herself close under the guns of the 
bombardment force. "Forty minutes before 
H-hour," Marston remembered, 
... the big guns of [the US battleship] 
Arkansas spoke for the first time, and 
right on schedule. We were in a position a 
few hundred yards from her and in her line 
of fire. The resultant blast, concussion, 
and general commotion shivered one's 
timbers more than a little, and the sweeping 
party on the quarter deck were prodded 
into such a frenzy of work and efficiency, 
that we were soon all clear to get the hell 
out of it, which we did by drawing off 
seaward, there to mosey around keeping 
clear of the vast numbers of ships all 
seemingly being drawn into the maw of the 
invasion beaches. 19 
Scores oflanding craft surged by the Bangors. 
Some sought directions- "Which way to Dog 
Red?"; others simply wanted information -
"What's it like in there?" The flotilla continued 
their role as spectators to the historic events 
unfolding around them - one sailor in 
Caraquet wrote in his diary "what a show; 
everything from soup to nuts floating 
around!"20 - until shortly after mid -day when 
they received orders to complete sweeping 
the Omaha fire support channels. The heavy 
congestion in the assault area made this slow 
going and it took until 2300 to complete. 
Their job done the flotilla anchored off Omaha . 
The D-Day minesweeping was a 
tremendous success. Despite the dire 
predictions of Allied naval commanders, losses 
during the assault were insignificant 
amounting to just one minesweeper, one 
destroyer and a few landing craft sunk. Losses 
over the following weeks mounted when the 
Germans began laying the virtually 
unsweepable "oyster" pressure mine but they 
came too late; the Allies were safely ashore 
and were able to build-up their strength and 
resources. The Bangors remained an 
important component in this process by 
maintaining the cleared passages off the 
beachhead and across the Channel. Indeed, 
of the 261 mines swept in the Western Task 
Force area between D-Day and 3 July, over 
one hundred it is difficult ascertain the 
exact figure- were swept by the Canadians. 
Given this accomplishment, it is fitting that 
the last word should go to the commander of 
the Western Task Force under whose orders 
the RCN sweepers sailed. In his final report 
on Neptune, Rear Admiral Alan Kirk 
concluded, "It can be said without fear of 
contradiction that minesweeping was the 
keystone of the arch in this operation."21 
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